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COMMENTS
some . . . profound interstitial change in the very tissue of the law." The rule had
a reasonably innocuous creation, a startling growth and a slower but nonetheless
sure decline. The decline illustrates very well the orthodox process of judicial
legislation by exception, elaboration and interpretation.
It is well that such a process is available, for the courts recognized early that
the broad general rule of immunity as originally stated would very often produce
absurd or unjust results. The process has reached a point in many jurisdictions
where it now might well be said that there is in fact no general immunity rule
but rather that as a general rule parents and children may sue one another for
tortious conduct except where the conduct is only simple negligence. Other juris-
dictions would pull up short at the dividing line between intentional and unin-
tentional conduct. This would seem to be the major area of development for the
next few years. At any rate it appears that the rule still prevails in all its pristine
vigor in only one jurisdiction, Tennessee.
EnwiN D. AKERS
WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND
USURY-EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GENERAL USURY STATUTES OF
MISSOURI-SECTIONS 408.050 AND 408.070
I. INTRODUCTION
Usury is generally defined today as "the receiving, securing, or taking of a
greater sum or value for the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in
action than is allowed by law-the exaction of a greater sum for the use of
money than the highest rate of interest allowed by law."'
In ancient Greece and Rome moderate interest on loans was allowed and
usury was probably given much the same definition as it is today.2 The rising
power of the young Christian church put an end to this idea and condemned
the taking of any interest whatsoever. 3 To the Christian church of that era
1. 55 AM. JuR. Usury § 2 (1946).
2. Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United
States, 44 A.B.A.J. 637 (1958).
3. Salin, Usury, 15 ENCYC. SoC. ScI. 193 (1935); Luke 6:34; Mat. 21:12-13.
See also Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343, 351, 63 S.W.2d 3, 6 (1933),
in which is quoted one of the orations of St. Basil, the famous Christian orator
of the fourth century, as follows: "The griping usurer sees, unmoved, his necessitous
borrower at his feet, condescending to every humiliation, professing everything
that is villifying; he feels no compassion for his fellow-creatures; though reduced
to this abject state of supplication, he yields not to his humble prayer; he is
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interest and usury were synonymous. The condemnation of charging even a
small interest for the lending of money was incorporated into canon law and
continued in Anglo-Saxon civilizations into the middle ages. 4 However, under
capitalistic development interest became tolerated and finally became excessive
in many instances, despite the disapproval of the Church.5 During the reign
of Henry VIII a law was passed in an attempt to regulate the excesses in interest
that were being charged in the lending of money. 6 This law gave official recognition
to the legality of charging interest, but made it a penal offense to charge more
than ten per cent as interest in a lending transaction. It was generally con-
sidered ineffective and was repealed during the reign of Edward VI.7 This re-
pealing statute reinstated the prohibition of taking any interest under penalty
of forfeiture of principal. This statute later was in turn repealed.8 After further
changes during the reigns of James I and Charles 11,10 the solution to the
problem of usury was given some degree of permanency during the reign of
Anne" when the prototype of modem usury legislation was enacted.' 2
In the United States the exaction of interest has never been against public
policy;' 3 nor does the common law of the United States prohibit the taking of
interest, though there is dictum that a contract with interest at an unconscionable
rate would be void.' 4 But the rates of interest allowable have generally been
inexorable to his entreatie; he melts not at his tears; he swears and protests that
he has no money, and that he is under necessity of borrowing himself; he acquires
credit to his lies by superadding an oath, and aggravates his inhuman and iniquitous
traffic with the grossest perjury. But when the wretched supplicant enters upon
the terms of the loan, his countenance is changed; he smiles with complacency; he
reminds him of his intimacy with his father, and treats him with the most
flattering cordiality. 'Let me see,' says he, 'if I have not some little cash in
store, for I ought to have some belonging to a friend who lent it to me on very
hard terms, to whom I pay most exorbitant interest for it; but I shall not
demand anything like that from you.' By fair words and promises, he seduces
and completely entangles him in his snares; he then gets 'his hand to paper and
completes his wretchedness. How so? By dismissing him bereft of liberty."
Query whether St. Basil did not accurately forecast the character of some modem-
day moneylenders and the plight of some modern-day borrowers.
4. See Kreibohm v. Yancey, 154 Mo. 67, 55 S.W. 260 (1900).
5. Salin, supra note 3.
6. 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545). There were prior attempts to curb usury but
they were mainly city ordinances. See 8 HOLDSwORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW
102 (1926).
7. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 20 (1551-1552).
8. 13 Eliz., c. 8 (1571).
9. 21 Jac. 1, c. 17 (1623).
10. 12 Car. 2, c. 13 (1660).
11. 12 Anne, c. 16 (1714). This statute was later repealed by 17 & 18 Vict.,
c. 90 (1854).
12. See Commonwealth v. Donoghue, supra note 3.
13. See Collins & Ham, The Usury Law of Arkansas: A Study in Evasion,
8 ARK. L. REv. 399 (1954); see also Cobb, Usury: Affirmnative Relief Under the
Florida Usury Statute, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 213 (1954).
14. Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 42 (1819).
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regulated by statute.15 Only three states have no statutes limiting the interest
rates which may be agreed upon by the parties.' 6
II. GENERAL APPLICATION OF Missouai's UsuRY LAWS
A. Lawful Rates of Interest
Missouri, from the time it was a territory to the present day, has always
had laws regulating interest rates. 7 The present interest rates are divided into
two categories, the classification depending mainly upon whether certain statutory
requirements are met.
1. Small Loans
The first category pertains to installment loans up to $500, as to which
the lender may charge as much as 2.218 per cent per month on the unpaid
balance if he complies with all the requirements of the small loan act. No loan
secured by liens on real estate, non-processed farm products, livestock, farm
machinery or crops will qualify under the small loan act,19 but other than this
there is really no clear criterion under the statute for distinguishing small loans
from usurious regular loans.
2. General Loans
The second category pertains to all loans, regardless of amount, not meeting
the special small loan requirements. There are two rates of interest which apply
to this second category: (1) if the parties agree that interest is to be charged
but do not agree upon an interest rate, the debtor is obligated to pay the "legal"
rate, which is six per cent simple interest,20 or (2) the parties may agree upon
a rate not to exceed eight per cent 2 ' compounded annually.22
15. Meth, supra note 2, at 638, indicates that 13 states have laws per-
mitting a maximum of 6% interest to be taken, 27 states allow from 7% through
11%, while 9 states allow 12% or more. In the matter of forfeiture for usury,
it seems that 13 states require the lender to forfeit the excess interest above
the maximum allowable, 18 states require forfeiture of a multiple of interest or
excessive interest, 1 state requires a forfeiture of all interest plus 8% of principal,
while 5 states require a forfeiture of all interest plus principal. In addition, in
17 states usury is a crime or misdemeanor. Four states have constitutional provi-
sions against usury.
16. See An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh. A Suggested Reform
for Usury Laws, 65 YALE L. J. 105 (1955).
17. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.050 (1952) for reference to Missouri's former
enactments regulating usury.
18. § 408.100, RSMo 1959.
19. See § 408.100, RSMo 1959.
20. § 408.020, RSMo 1959. Such an agreement may be oral even though
the remainder of the contract is written. See Coombes v. Knowlson, 193 Mo. App.
554, 182 S.W. 1040 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916).
21. § 408.030, RSMo 1959.
22. § 408.080, RSMo 1959. The agreement to pay eight per cent or com-
pounded interest must be in writing; if such an agreement is oral, the lender is
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B. Elements and Essentials of Usury
In Missouri, as in other states, usury rests wholly upon statutes.23 Missouri's
definition of usury is "interest in excess of a legal rate charged to a borrower
for the use of money,"24 which seems to be the same as that generally given.
25
The elements necessary to render a transaction usurious are:
(1) unlawful intent; (2) subject-matter must be money or its equivalent;
(3) a loan or forbearance; (4) the sum loaned must be absolutely, not
contingently, payable; and (5) there must be an exaction for the use
of the loan of something in excess of what is allowed by law.
26
Although there is a stricter requirement as to the other elements, the element
of unlawful intent is presumed if the transaction requires the payment of a
usurious rate of interest.2 7 The requirement of a loan or forbearance is strictly
adhered to in Missouri, 2s but as stated in Quinn v. Van Raalte:29
It is not necessary, in order to constitute a loan, that there should be in
very terms, an application to borrow, or an agreement to lend. Every
advancement of money, for the accommodation of another, to be re-
paid . . . by the person receiving it, or by any person for him, or by or
out of his funds, is literally and legally, a loan of money.
23. Gehlert v. Smiley, 114 S.W.2d 1029 (Mo. 1937).
24. Bahl v. Miles, 222 Mo. App. 984, 987, 6 S.W.2d 661, 663 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1928).
25. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
26. Allen v. Newton, 219 Mo. App. 74, 79, 266 S.W. 327, 329 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1924).
27. Securities Inv. Co. v. Rottweiler, 7 S.W.2d 484, 486 (St. L. Ct. App.
1928), wherein the court stated: ". . . the law will presume the necessary intent
from the mere fact that the parties intentionally did what was in fact forbidden
by statute." Osborn v. Payne, 111 Mo. App. 29, 85 S.W. 667 (K.C. Ct. App.
1905), indicates that the transaction itself, not the intention of the parties,
determines the question of usury. But see Warinner v. Nugent, 362 Mo. 233, 239,
240, 240 S.W.2d 941, 944 (1951), where defendant persuaded plaintiff to sell
her corporate shares and lend him the money. The stock had declined in value
due to the depression from the purchase price of $4400 to $1000. Defendant
promised to repay the original purchase price of $4400 if plaintiff would sell at
the reduced price and lend him the money. The court held that the transaction
was not usurious as a matter of law, and further stated: "But again the question
is one of purpose and intention. If the agreement was merely a device to evade
the usury laws the transaction was usurious. On the other hand if the bargain
was collateral to the loan and not a mere device to avoid the law of usury the
transaction was not usurious." It seems difficult to imagine how this transaction
could be anything other than a usurious loan.
28. Personal Fin. Co. v. Endicott, 238 S.W.2d 51 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951),
wherein it was held that there was no loan going from the finance company to
a purchaser who had bought a chattel from a dealer who arranged the financing
through the finance company.
29. 276 Mo. 71, 100, 205 S.W. 59, 67 (1918). The plaintiff had an option
on property but was unable to exercise it due to lack of funds. The defendant
agreed to buy the property at the option price and then resell it to plaintiff
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However, Missouri courts do sometimes fail to find loans in transactions which
courts of other states call loans.30
C. Test of Usury
1. Under Small Loan Act
The test of usury under the small loan acts is whether any sum (except
that included as a result of a bona fide error) was charged or received by the
lender in addition to the statutory maximum interest rate and the service charges
allowed. 3'
2. Under General Usury Statutes
As a general proposition the test used by the courts to determine whether or
not a general loan contract is usurious is "whether it would, if performed, result
in securing a greater rate of profit on the subject-matter than is allowed by
law."32 More specifically, Missouri's basic prohibition against taking excessive
interest 33 expressly refers to both the six per cent "legal" interest section and
the "specified rate up to eight per cent" section. This statute has been interpreted
to mean that a contract is usurious if: (1) the parties expressly agree there is
to be interest but no rate is specified and the lender actually takes a sum larger
than six per cent per annum on the debt,34 or (2) the specified interest rate
is lower than eight per cent but the lender actually takes more than the stated
rate,35 or (3) the stated rate is eight per cent but the lender takes an excess,86
or (4) the stated rate is in excess of eight per cent and the lender takes the
stated amount.37 The fact that the excess sum is charged as a penalty for the
borrower's not having repaid the loan at maturity does not relieve the transaction
of its usurious taint.3s
30. This is mainly in the area of credit sales where a finance company is
involved. See note 119 infra and accompanying text.
31. See §§ 408.140-.150, RSMo 1959.
32. Kreibohm v. Yancey, 154 Mo. 67, 85, 55 S.W. 260, 266 (1900).
33. § 408.050, RSMo 1959.
34. Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Donnell, 172 Mo. 384, 72 S.W. 925 (1903) (en
banc), where plaintiff charged 12% interest on defendant's overdrafts.
35. Holmes v. Royal Loan Ass'n, 166 Mo. App. 719, 150 S.W. 1111 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1912), where the specified rate was 6% but the lender also included
a "bonus" charge. Accord, Lawler v. Vette, 166 Mo. App. 342, 149 S.W. 43 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1912). Contra, Allen v. Newton, supra note 26, where the specified
rate was 7%, and the court indicated that the contract would not be usurious
unless an excess of 8% was taken. Cf. Taylor v. Buzard, 114 Mo. App. 622, 90
S.W. 126 (K.C. Ct. App. 1905).
36. Osborne v. Fridrich, 134 Mo. App. 449, 114 S.W. 1045 (St. L. Ct. App.
1908), where the specified rate was 8% but the lender always charged an excess
amount when the notes became due.
37. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Tomlin, 174 Mo. App. 512, 161 S.W.
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D. Penalties Assessed Against Usurious Lenders
As a deterrent to lenders who would charge more than lawful interest,
Missouri laws provide both criminal and civil sanctions against such lenders.
1. Small Loans
In the small loan field,39 as a criminal sanction the applicable section provides
that for any violation of the small loan acts the lender shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.40 Whether or not this is an actual deterrent is somewhat doubtful.
41
The civil remedy is quite drastic in its somewhat limited sphere of appli-
cability. If the lender charges or receives more than the maximum rate allowable,
except as a result of a bona fide error, all evidence of the loan and all security
therefor are unenforceable.' 2 Thus it seems that if either the lender or the borrower
brings suit prior to repayment of the total debt and the loan is proven to be
usurious, then the lender forfeits the unpaid remainder of interest and principal.
The actual penalty assessed against the lender would depend, of course, on how
much of the debt was unpaid at the time of the suit.
The question of whether or not the borrower can recover any part of the
principal and legal interest which he has already paid to the lender does not
seem to have been answered in Missouri.
2. General Loans
The criminal prohibition against usurious lenders in the general loan field
(where the general usury statutes are applicable) is more lenient toward the
lender than that in the small loan area. In the general loan area the lender is
guilty of a misdemeanor only if he takes or receives or agrees to take or receive
more than two per cent interest per month.43 Thus in a general loan the lender
must have charged interest at three times the lawful maximum rate of eight
per cent per annum before he is subject to criminal prosecution. The ineffectiveness
of this law may easily be seen.
The civil remedies for usury in the general loan field, with which the remainder
of this article is concerned, penalize the usurious lender in two ways: (1) the
borrower may recover the sum paid in excess of principal and legal rate of interest
and the lender is liable for the costs of suit, plus a reasonable attorney's fee,44
or, if any part of the principal and legal interest is still owed to the lender, the
borrower may offset the usury he has paid against such amount;45 and (2) the
borrower may have declared invalid any lien of personal property which he has
pledged or mortgaged to the lender as security for the usurious loan.49
39. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
40. § 408.220, RSMo 1959.
41. See A Symposium on the Small Loan Problem in Missouri, 16 Mo. L.
REv. 195 (1951).
42. § 408.150, RSMo 1959.
43. § 563.800, RSMo 1959.
44. § 408.050, RSMo 1959. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
45. § 408.060, RSMo 1959.
46. § 408.070, RSMo 1959.
[Vol. 26
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As may be observed from the above discussion, the penalties for usury are
assessed solely against the lender and not against the borrower. Thus Missouri
has retreated from its previous hard-to-support position that the borrower who
pays usury is in pari delicto with the lender,47 and now follows the doctrine that
the wrong is wholly that of the lender.48
Although Missouri's usury laws seem to be on a par with those of the
majority of the states,49 they are inadequate in many instances to protect borrowers
from unscrupulous lenders, and the injury is often compounded by the courts,
which at times seem to have more sympathy with lenders than with borrowers.50
E. Transactions Examined
Some of the transactions examined and discussed in this section are clearly
loans, some are directly or indirectly involved with the lending of money, while
still others, although resembling loans, have not been held to be such.
1. Brokers' Commissions
If the loan is procured through the borrower's agent or through an independ-
ent broker,, there is no usury even though the borrower pays a commission to the
agent or broker for procuring the loan while, at the same time, paying the maxi-
mum lawful rate of interest to the lender.51 But the courts scrutinize these trans-
actions to determine if the agent purporting to be that of the borrower is in
reality the lender or the lender's agent.52 Factors taken into consideration in de-
termining whether the agent is that of the lender or the borrower are: closeness
of relationship between lender and broker, 53 number of prior transactions between
lender and broker,5 4 and whether or not the broker is regularly employed by the
47. See Rutherford v. Williams, 42 Mo. 18, 35 (1867), wherein it was
declared: "So far as it was illegal, the plaintiff [debtor] is in the situation of
a wrong-doer as well as defendant [money lender], and equity will not relieve
him...
48. Missouri Real Estate Syndicate v. Sims, 179 Mo. 679, 686, 78 S.W.
1006, 1008 (1904): "It is deemed that his (the debtor's) consent to the corrupt
contract was obtained by moral duress such as to take from him the character
of particeps criminis."
49. See note 15 supra.
50. See Tobin v. Neuman, 271 S.W. 842 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925), where the
court refused to declare the transaction a usurious loan partly because the lender
would have lost his lien and have been relegated to the position of a general
creditor.
51. Hecker v. Putney, 196 S.W.2d 442 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946); Cuendet v.
Love, Bryan & Co., 57 S.W.2d 701 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933); Fischman v. Schultz,
55 S.W.2d 313 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932).
52. Cavally v. Crutcher, 9 S.W.2d 848 (Spr. Ct. App. 1928). The court
found that the agent-payee was in reality just a conduit for the lender's loan
to the borrower and not really the borrower's agent.
53. State v. Sargent, 256 S.W.2d 265 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953) (agent was
ex-husband of the lender); Cavally v. Crutcher, supra note 52 (agent was father
of lender).
54. Leavel v. Johnston, 209 Mo. App. 197, 232 S.W. 1064 (K.C. Ct. App.
1921). (The agent was trustee of a loan fund from his sister's estate; he had
made several prior loans.)
1961]
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lender.55 If the intermediate party is found to be the lender's agent, any commis-
sion retained by him in addition to the lawful rate of interest going to the lender
makes the loan usurious even though the lender received none of the commission
charged, or in fact did not know that the agent charged such a commission.56
That the parties designate the intermediate party as the borrower's agent will not
prevent the court from finding that he is in fact the agent of the lender.57 Further-
more, if the intermediate party is the agent of the borrower and agrees to procure
a loan for the borrower but instead borrows the money on his own credit and
then relends it to the borrower, the courts hold that the intermediate party be-
comes in fact the lender and he may not legally charge a commission in addition
to the interest.58
2. Note Discounting or Commission Charging by Lender
A lender and holder of the borrower's promissory notes may "discount" or
sell them to a third person at a price which is a fractional part of the face value
of the notes and if the transaction is a bona fide sale it could not come within the
usury statutes no matter how large the difference between the sale price and the
face value of the notes.5 9 At the same time, if the lender "discounts" them from
the borrower (gives the borrower less than the face value of the notes) and the
difference between the "discount" price and the face amount of the note amounts
to more than lawful interest or is in addition to lawful interest, then the loan is
usurious.50 This is true whether the "discounted" sum is labeled as "additional
compensation"61 for making the loan, "bonus," 62 or as "expenses" which were not
incurred. 3 The courts examine these transactions carefully to determine if the pur-
55. Wintergirst v. Collateral Loan Co., 60 Mo. App. 166 (St. L. Ct. App.
1895) (agent was manager of the loan company).
56. Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Glasner, 169 Mo. 38, 68 S.W. 917
(1902), where the lender's agent charged the borrower 2% of the loan as his
commission. The lender was unaware that the agent had made any charge. Cf.
Landis v. Saxton, 89 Mo. 375, 1 S.W. 359 (1886), where the agent was the
executor of an estate and loaned the borrower $15,000 of the estate, retaining
$1000 as a bonus. The court indicated that the bonus was illegal, not because
the lender's agent retained it, but because the executor should not be allowed to
make a profit from his estate.
57. State v. Sargent, supra note 53; Wintergirst v. Collateral Loan Co., sapra
note 55.
58. Osborn v. Payne, 111 Mo. App. 29, 85 S.W. 667 (K.C. Ct. App 1905).
The plaintiff had promised to pay defendant $25 if defendant would obtain a loan
of $650 for 'him. Defendant borrowed the money on his own credit and re-loaned
it to plaintiff, taking the $25 in addition to lawful interest. Cf. Quinn v. Van
Raalte, supra note 29. Contra, Tobin v. Neuman, supra note 50.
59. Personal Fin. Co. v. Endicott, 238 S.W.2d 51 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951)
(prom~issory notes of value of $5,084.60 sold for $4,540.60).
60. Castorina v. Herrmann, 340 Mo. 1026, 104 S.W.2d 297 (1937) (note in
question drew 6% interest but lender "discounted" it an additional 7%).
61. Id.
62. Lyons v. Smith, 111 Mo. App. 272, 86 S.W. 918 (K.C. Ct. App. 1905)
(note drew 8% interest but lender retained $40 as a -bonus). Arbuthnot v.
Brookfield Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 98 Mo. App. 382, 72 S.W. 132 (K.C. Ct. App.
1903) (bonus was 28-Vz%).
63. Voorhis v. Staed, 63 Mo. App. 370 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
[Vol. 26
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ported third party buyer of the notes is in reality the lender.64 For example, in
Anderson v. Curls,6 5 the plaintiff gave her personal note with a face value of $400,
plus six per cent interest, to an intermediate party who "sold" the note to defend-
ant for $200. The intermediate party kept $25 for his services and gave the plain-
tiff the remaining $175. The court found that defendant was in fact the lender
and not a purchaser of the discounted note, and that the $200 "discount" was
usury.66
3. Charges for Services
The ban on retention of commissions by the lender or his agent does not
extend to charges for services rendered by the lender or his agent. Missouri's posi-
tion on charges for such services has been summarized as follows:
[ . . T]he nature of the services, whether they are substantial, necessary
and valuable, and whether the amount attempted to be exacted for the
rendition of the services is reasonable, are determinative factors in con-
struing whether the contract be for the rendition of services alone or
merely a cloak whereby excess interest over the legal rate may be col-
lected by the lender.67
The services must have actually been performed but they may be directly con-
nected with the loan as in Stewart v. Boone County Trust Co. 68 In that case the
plaintiff had obtained a loan from defendant by pledging a number of tax bills as
security. The loan contract provided that defendant was to collect the tax bills,
and retain the principal debt, eight per cent interest, plus five per cent for services
in collecting the bills. The court indicated that the mere fact that the five per
64. Hecker v. Putney, supra note 51. The court found that there was no
bona fide sale of the notes but that the "buyer" was in fact the lender and
that the payee of the notes who was the "buyer's" employee was just a straw
party. But see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68,
262 S.W. 425 (K.C. Ct. App. ,1924). The court found a bona fide sale of the
defendant's note from the dealer-payee to the finance company even though the
finance company had participated in the transaction between dealer and defendant.
The note, with a face value of $901, was "sold" to the finance company for $850.
The court found that the $51 "discount" was legal in spite of the fact that the
dealer testified that he was the finance company's agent for a loan to the defendant.
65. 309 S.W.2d 692 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
66. A similar finding was made in Lawler v. Vette, 166 Mo. App. 342, 149
S.W. 43 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912). In that case the plaintiff went to an intermediate
party to request that a $3000 loan be obtained for her. The intermediate party
then went to defendant who agreed to "buy" plaintiff's promissory notes with
a face value of $3000 for $2500. The court found as a matter of fact there was
no sale but that defendant had loaned the money to plaintiff. But see Major
v. Putney, 293 S.W. 81 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927), where the court found a valid
sale even though the purchaser was the sole shareholder of the corporate payee.
67. Stewart v. Boone County Trust Co., 230 Mo. App. 120, 126, 87 S.W.2d
223, 226 (St. L. Ct. App. 1935). See also Crow v. Stevenson, 274 S.W. 1102 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1925). In the Crow case the lender contended that his services were in
getting borrower's creditors to agree to accept $.75 on each $1.00 of the borrower's
debts. The court found that no services had been performed and that the $833.84
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cent charge was for services directly connected with the loan would not render the
transaction usurious so long as the charge was found to be reasonable, and re-
manded the case for jury trial on the issues of reasonableness of the charge and
whether or not the services were substantial or insubstantial.
Although it is said that charges for services must not be unreasonable,69 de-
terminations as to whether or not the charges are reasonable are left to the jury70
and the results are not always equitable. A prime example would be the case of
Hansen v. Duvall,71 where the lender had sold some of the borrower's promissory
notes to third parties but retained the remainder. The court allowed the lender
to charge the borrower from twelve and one-half per cent to twenty-five per cent
of the royalties of three producing oil wells in exchange for the lender's "services,"
consisting of his guaranteeing to the third parties payment of the borrower's notes
in the amount of $36,000. The borrower was further obligated to place fifty per
cent of the royalties into a trust for the payment of the notes, so it is questionable
as to how much of a guarantor the lender really was. In less than one year and
eight months the lender had been paid in excess of $9,000 from the royalty in-
terests for his "services." This also illustrates that courts are reluctant to over-
turn the findings of the jury even though the court itself might not have reached
the same decision. Another example is Williams v. American Exch. Bank,72 where
the court affirmed the jury's findings that $1040 paid to defendant by plaintiff
was compensation for defendant's services (an agreement not to bid at a sale of
drug stock), and was not a charge for the use of $6000 which defendant had
loaned to plaintiff.
4. Renewals or Extensions
The prohibition against the lender's "discounting" the borrower's notes in
addition to charging legal interest also extends to making such "discounts" or
charges upon the renewal or extension of the notes or debt.75 Thus in Lyons v.
Smit, 7 4 where the lender charged the borrower $40 as a condition to the renewal
of a $400 note, the court declared that the charge had rendered the loan usurious.
As a corollary to the rule relating to charges for renewals, the courts further
hold that if there was usury in the original transaction, such usury follows the
69. Leavel v. Johnston, supra note 54.
70. Stewart v. Boone County Trust Co., supra note 67.
71. 333 Mo. 59, 62 S.W.2d 732 (1933). But see State v. Sargent, supra
note 53, where a contrary result was had. But in that case the borrower had
not been aware that the agent was guaranteeing his notes to the lender.
72. Williams v. American Exch. Bank, 222 Mo. App. 483, 280 S.W. 720
(K.C. Ct. App. 1926). But see Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Glasner,
supra note 56, where a 2% charge for "services" was held to be usury. The
"services" were in making the loan, examining the title to the security, examining
the security and attending the proposed renewals.
73. Missouri Real Estate Syndicate v. Sims, 179 Mo. 679, 78 S.W. 1006
(1904) ($100 given as consideration for promise to give extension of time on
mortgage and note held to be usury); Adams v. Moody, 91 Mo. App. 41 (KIC.
Ct. App. 1901) (charge of $2.50 for a three months' extension of note held to
be usury).
74. Supra note 62.
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indebtedness through all its renewals.75 The fact that the usurious interest exacted
in the first note was included in the renewal note as principal will not prevent the
second note from being usurious.76 Furthermore, it is not necessary that the bor-
rower have knowledge of the usury in the original transaction for him to avail
himself of it in the later renewal.77 However, the fact that the original obligation
was usurious will not prevent the parties from legalizing the renewal note or ex-
tension. This may be done by simply deleting from the new contract or notes
that amount which made the original loan usurious.
78
5. Compounding Interest
Compound interest is generally thought of as interest upon interest, i.e., the
interest upon a sum of money being added to the debt, and then bearing interest
itself.79 Missouri law allows the annual compounding of even the maximum lawful
interest rate,80 but to compound interest more often than once per year is ex-
pressly prohibited. 8' Even annual compounding is not allowed in Missouri unless
the parties expressly so agree in writing.82 Missouri courts hold that a provision
in a contract calling for compounding interest more often than once a year is
void even if such compounding was done as a penalty for the borrower's not hav-
ing made a payment of lawful interest on time.83 However, the courts hold that
75. Foskin v. Laessig, 32 S.W.2d 768 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930). (Twelve per
cent interest had been paid on the original note which was executed in 1913.
In 1924 a new note was substituted. The court held that the usurious taint fol-
lowed into the new note.) Hecker v. Putney, supra note 51. See also Osborne v.
Fridrich, 134 Mo. App. 449 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908), where defendant was an
accommodation indorser on notes which were usurious because of charges for
renewals. The lender started suit against defendant and as a compromise defendant
executed as maker the notes in question which included the usurious charges.
The court held that the second notes were usurious also. But compare Coleman
v. Cole, 69 Mo. App. 530 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897), where defendant had been
the guarantor of the original notes which were usurious, but later he became
joint maker of notes which were substituted for the originals. It was held that
the substituted notes were also usurious. This was reversed in Coleman v. Cole,
158 Mo. 253, 260, 59 S.W. 106 (1900). The court indicated that the second note
was not usurious and stated: ".. . if the transaction is a simple purchase of
a previously executed and uttered evidence of debt, it is as legal as any purchase
of any other merchantable article."
76. Johnson v. Grayson, 230 Mo. 380, 130 S.W. 673 (1910).
77. Foskin v. Laessig, suwpra note 75.
78. Peters Shoe Co. v. Arnold, 82 Mo. App. 1 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899). (After
the parties discovered that an excess charge of $350 had been included in the
note and mortgage and that interest had been illegally compounded, they exe-
cuted a new note and mortgage stating the correct amounts and deleting the
illegal compounding provision. It was held that the second note and mortgage
was not usurious.)
79. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
80. § 408.080, RSMo 1959.
81. § 408.0S0, RSMo 1959.
82. Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Donnell, 172 Mo. 384, 72 S.W. 925 (1903) (en
banc); Coombes v. Knowlson, 182 S.W. 1040 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916).
83. Whitworth v. Davey, 185 S.W. 241 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916). But see
Barutio v. New York Life Ins. Co., 177 S.W.2d 685 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944),
which involved an insurance policy which was kept in force through payment
of quarterly premiums. The policy provided that the insured might pay premiums
1961]
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an illegal compounding provision does not necessarily bring the contract within
the purview of the usury statutes."s This holding is based on the fact that the
basic usury statute does not specifically refer to the compounding prohibition as
it does to the sections regulating interest rates. The reason it does not may be,
as one court suggests, that the illegal compounding provisions do not constitute
usury but are only "harsh and oppressive" and "tended to usury."8 5 This seems to
be a nice distinction in view of the fact that a lender may, by using illegal com-
pounding provisions, stand to gain an illegal profit which is as great or greater
than if he had openly charged a usurious interest rate, but still not be subject to
the penalties of usury.88
6. Installment Loanss7
Installment loans are typically those which are borrowed in a lump sum but
are repaid by periodic installments over a stated length of time.8s Because of the
complexities in figuring the amounts of interest that can be legally charged on a
loan the principal of which is decreased by each installment paid, the installment
loan transaction is often a source of illegal profits for the lenders.89 The device
most often used by the lenders in gaining their illegal profits is that of charging
maximum legal interest on the whole sum loaned until the last installment is to
be paid. This interest is simply added to the principal debt and paid in propor-
tion to the installment.° ° For example, in Hanson v. Acceptance Fin. Co.,91
by executing promissory notes, but that if such note was not paid prior to the
time another quarterly premium became due then insured would execute a new
note which would include the unpaid balance of the prior note, accrued interest
on the prior note and a sum sufficient to cover the premium then due. Thus
interest was being compounded four times per year. The court found that this
did not violate the compounding statute. It is doubtful that such a holding would
receive much support in other situations. See Vaughn v. Graham, 234 Mo. App.
781, 121 S.W.2d 222 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938), which reached a seemingly contrary
result.
84. The somewhat anomalous result is reached that, while the contract
calling for this illegal compounding is notusurious, if the borrower has paid all
the interest called for in the contract he has paid usury. Whitworth v. Davey,
279 Mo. 672, 216 S.W. 736 (1919). But see Forgan v. Bridges, 281 S.W. 134 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1926), where the note was due in six months and included six months'
interest but also provided that the total was to bear interest from maturity.
85. Whitworth v. Davey, supra note 84.
86. The civil remedies available to the borrower where the loan contract
calls for illegal compounding will be amplified further in later sections dealing
with specific application of §§ 408.050 and 408.070.
87. Many problems arising in this area will be solved by application of the
"small loan" acts rather than the general usury sections.
88. Hecker v. Putney, 196 S.W.2d 442 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946). The borrower
was obliged to pay back $725.50 in twelve equal monthly installments after
having received only $560 after the lender had retained a usurious commission.
89. Hanson v. Acceptance Fin. Co., 270 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1954).
90. See Lawler v. Vette, 166 Mo. App. 342, 149 S.W. 43 (St. L. Ct. App.
1912). The borrower received only $2500 but the contract stated that she was
to repay $3000 in 40 equal monthly installments, an amount equal to the principal
sum plus 6% interest per annum for the 3-1/3 years on the total principal. Cf.
Van Docren v. Pelt, 184 S.W.2d 744 (St. L. Ct. App. 1945), where the borrower
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the principal debt was $1663.20, to be repaid in 18 monthly installments. The debt
allegedly was to draw eight per cent interest but the lender included the sum of
$226.80 interest to be paid proportionately to the installments. This sum of in-
terest was in excess of the amount which could have been charged had the trans-
action not been an installment loan. Thus the borrower was paying interest at
approximately twice the lawful rate. When such a provision is called to the atten-
tion of the court it is declared usurious92
As a necessary corollary, a lender cannot charge interest for a longer period
than the length of time the loan is to run.9 However, if the loan contract does
not provide for optional prepayment, the fact that the borrower repays the loan
prior to the maturity date will not prevent the lender from legally charging maxi-
mum lawful interest for the full period.94
7. Salary Purchasing-Assignment of Future Wages
Purported salary purchasing transactions have also fallen under the ban on
usury when the profits realized by the "purchaser" are greater than the lawful rate
of interest chargeable on the amount the "seller" received. For example, in Tol-
man v. Union Gas. & Surety Co,95 the "seller" received $83 from the "purchaser"
and in return assigned him the right to receive from "seller's" employer $140 plus
six per cent interest from the "seller's" wages which were to be earned over the fol-
lowing year. The court recognized this transaction as a cloak for a usurious loan
from the "purchaser" to the "seller" and that the "assignment" was nothing more
than security for the loan. The court did not decide whether or not a valid assign-
ment of future wages could be made. And in Bell v. Mulholland,96 the court indi-
borrowed $150 from the lender. The lender deducted $12 interest in advance
from the $150 (8% of $150 for 1 year). The loan was to be repaid $3 per week
for 50 weeks.
91. Supra note 89.
92. Hecker v. Putney, supra note 88; Van Doeren v. Pelt, Lawler v. Vette,
supra note 90. In Hanson v. Acceptance Fin. Co., supra note 89, the court found
the contract to be usurious but plaintiff was allowed no relief because he had
used the wrong theory for recovery. Plaintiff sought recovery for the lender's
fraud and deceit. The contract related and the lender orally declared that the
borrower was to pay only eight per cent interest, but the court found that the
action of fraud and deceit would not lie even though the borrower was obliged
to pay interest at twice that rate. The court said that the borrower was not
entitled to rely on the representations of the lender because the contract also
specified the amount in dollars that was alloted to interest, and that the borrower
should have been able to compute the interest himself and determine that the
specified amount did not result from the specified rate. The court further held
that there was no relationship of confidence or trust between the parties. Query
whether the court had ever read or heard any loan company advertisements.
93. Van Doeren v. Pelt, supra note 90, where the loan was to be repaid in
50 weeks, but interest was figured for a full year.
94. Hanson v. Acceptance Fin. Co., supra note 89.
95. 90 Mo. App. 274 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901).
96. 90 Mo. App. 612 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901). (Assignor assigned to the
lender the right to receive $80 from his wages. The assignor received $76 for
the assignment and had repaid $4 "interest" each month for over two years.
The court restrained the assignee from presenting his assignment to the assignor's
employer and also declared the assignment void.)
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cated that while a sale or assignment of future wages might possibly be valid if
the "seller-assignor" were presently employed, there could be no such assignment
if he was unemployed at the time of the assignment or sale.07 The court further
indicated that a stipulation in the contract to the effect that the transaction was a
sale of wages and not a loan would not prevent the court from finding that the
transaction was in fact a usurious loan. The fatal blow to these purported salary
purchases or assignments was administered by the court in State v.* Salary Puer-
chasing Co.,"" where it was held that such an assignment or sale of future wages
was void under the Missouri statute, now Section 432.030, Revised Statutes of
Missouri (1959), and could not possibly be anything more than a loan which
would be usurious if a profit larger than lawful interest was realized by the lender.
Although an assignment of wages already earned is valid, it is probable that
such an assignment would be subjected to close inspection by the courts to de-
termine if it was in reality a cloak for a usurious loan.09 It should also be noted
that section 408.210110 provides that any assignment of earned wages of $400 or
less is deemed to be a loan and is regulated by the small loan acts.
8. Sale of Credit
A sale of credit might be thought of as a transaction whereby the "seller" of
the credit "sells" to the "buyer" the right to incur obligations with or borrow
money from a third person with the representation that if the "buyer" does not
pay the obligation then the "seller" will. 10' The most common type of this trans-
action is where the "seller" becomes a guarantor or surety of the "buyer-maker's"
promissory notes running to the third person. 0 2 Missouri's position on these
transactions is that:
a sale in good faith ...of credit, if the seller has no other interest
in the transaction, is valid and not open to the objection of usury what-
ever the price [charged by the seller for his credit].1° 3
97. See also State v. Williamson, 118 Mo. 146, 23 S.W. 1054 (1893), where
the defendant was being criminally prosecuted for embezzlement. He had assigned
his future wages to the prosecuting witness, but had collected the wages himself.
The court, emphasizing that defendant was a government employee, held that
he was not guilty and that the assignment was void as against public policy.
The matter was given some degree of permanency by Mo. Laws 1911, at 143,
§ 1 (now § 432.030, RSMo 1959), which declared that assignments of unearned
wages were null and void. See Henderson v. Tolman, 130 Mo. App. 498, 109 S.W.
76 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) (assignment of wages to secure a usurious loan void).
98. 358 Mo. 1022, 218 S.W.2d 571 (1949) (en banc). This was a quo
warranto proceeding. The corporation's charter was revoked and it was fined
$5000 for its violations.
99. Id.
100. § 408.210, RSMo 1959.
101. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Hamilton, 230 Mo. App. 430, 91 S.W.2d
193 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936); Jobes v. Miller, 201 Mo. App. 45, 209 S.W. 549 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1919).
102. SixTH DEC. DIG. Usury § 28 (1958).
103. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78,
262 S.W. 425, 428 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
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Missouri courts do, however, occasionally find usurious loans in what are purported
.sale of credit transactions. In White v. Anderson,10 4 the purported "seller" issued
coupons to the "buyer" in exchange for the "buyer's" promissory notes. The buyer
-could exchange the coupons for merchandise in several designated stores. The
seller redeemed the coupons from the store for cash. The seller's profit was realized
from the promissory notes which were of a larger amount than the face value of
the coupons, and from the amount for which he redeemed the coupons at a dis-
-count from the stores. The court found that there was no actual sale of credit but
that this was merely a loan, the loan being usurious because the seller's profit was
greater than allowable interest. The court stated the criterion to be used to de-
termine whether there was a genuine sale of credit or whether the transaction was
merely a cloak for a loan as follows:
The one important feature which the transaction lacks of being a sale of
credit, such as in the sale of a guaranty or indorsement, is that in those
instances there is no advance of money made by the guarantor or indorser
to or for the party guaranteed or indorsed, and he still owes the debt;
while in this case there is an advance of money for the [buyer] by the
[seller] in full discharge of his debt and he does not owe anything to
the merchant, but does owe the [seller]. When he gave [seller] his note
ostensibly for the coupons, it was in reality for the money which [buyer]
used in paying for the goods. 105
9. Requiring the Borrower to Buy Insurance
Missouri courts condone the practice of a lender's requiring a borrower to
purchase great quantities of life and/or property insurance as a condition precedent
to receiving a loan, with the lender being named as beneficiary.10 6 The loan may
'still draw maximum lawful interest.107 The justification given for this practice is
that the lender must have security for his loan. However, this practice has been
allowed even though the borrower gave the lender a mortgage on property of twice
the value of the loan.' 0 8 In most cases the lender, by a strange coincidence, just hap-
pens to be selling the insurance that he requires the borrower to buy and proba-
bly draws the same commission from the insurance company that the company
pays to its other agents in a comparable sale. 0 9 But the courts do not find this
offensive under the usury statutes.110 To show usury in such a transaction, the
104. 164 Mo. App. 132, 147 S.W. 1122 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912).
105. Id. at 138, 147 S.W. at 1124. It seems difficult to reconcile the quoted
statement with the court's position in the credit sales transactions.
106. Hanson v. Acceptance Fin. Co., supra note 89. The loan was $1400 and
the borrower was obliged to buy $201.76 worth of life, health and accident
insurance, plus $43.90 worth of insurance for his car.
107. Id.
108. Rukavina v. Accounts Supervision Corp., 241 Mo. App. 195, 237 S.W.2d
503 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951). (Plaintiff borrowed $150, executed a mortgage on
$300 worth of property, but was required to buy life. accident, health, and fire
insurance.)
109. See Birkhead, Illegal Lending in Missouri, 16 Mo. L. REv. 251 (1951).
110. And see § 367.170, RSMo 1959, which gives legislative blessing to the
practice of requiring insurance in the case of certain loans.
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courts would require the borrower to prove that the lender retained all or a por-
tion of the insurance premiums."' This sets an almost impossible task for the
borrower since the lender has probably retained possession of the insurance policies
and the borrower may never have seen them or even know the name of the in-
surance company with which he is supposedly insured 2 2 In the typical transac-
tion the borrower is also forced to borrow the amount of the insurance premiums
from the lender so that the lender may not only charge interest on the amount
actually received by the borrower but also on the amount loaned for the
premiums.213 Courts of some states have held that requiring the borrower to buy
insurance in addition to paying maximum lawful interest renders the loan usurious;
but Missouri's position is probably that of the majority?'14
10. Credit Sales
Missouri courts refuse to break away from the traditional view that there
is no usury in a credit sale transaction even though the seller increases the credit
sale price of the goods an unconscionable amount over the cash price." 5 Further-
more, it has been held that the inflated unpaid balance can still legally draw max-
imum lawful interest before and after maturity,"16 though it would probably be
imprudent for a businessman to rely on this. The courts seemingly base their
rationale on the somewhat fallacious theory that "a purchaser is not like the
needy borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since he can refrain from the
purchase if he does not choose to pay the price asked by the seller.""' l 7 The
courts fail to recognize that the purchaser is often as needy as the borrower since
money is generally borrowed, not for its intrinsic value, but solely to make pur-
chases. The courts' lenient attitude toward credit sale transactions is also extended
in favor of a finance company which purports to purchase the buyer's promissory
notes at a discount equal to the time price differential from the dealer who sold
the goods."18 The courts find bona fide sales of these notes to the finance company
111. Rukavina v. Accounts Supervision Corp., supra note 108.
112. Id.
113. See Annot., 21 A.L.R. 797, 876 (1922).
114. Id. See also Annot., 1 A.L.R. 834 (1919).
115. Wyatt v. Commercial Credit Corp., 341 S.W.2d 348 (K.C. Ct. App.
1960). (The unpaid balance of the credit sale price of $18,512.56 included $3,332.26
as finance charges.) Holland-O'Neal Milling Co. v. Rawlings, 217 Mo. App. 466,
268 S.W. 683 (Spr. Ct. App. 1925).
116. Holland-O'Neal Milling Co. v. Rawlings, supra note 115. (The cash sale
price was $7900 but was increased by 20% to $9480 for a credit price. The pur-
chase money note drew 8% interest from date.) J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co.
v. Tomlin, 174 Mo. App. 512, 161 S.W. 286 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913). (Note drew
6% before maturity, 10% after. The court declared the 10% charge made the
transaction usurious.) Thus it seems that if the increase is given the name of
increase in sale price it is legal, while if the same increase is in the form of
interest in excess of 8% it is usurious.
117. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, supra note 103, at 78,
262 S.W. at 428.
118. General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Propst, 239 S.W.2d 563 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1951) (sale of automobile on "time," with credit price increase by $379.19
over cash price-purchaser's purchase money note sold to finance company at
$379.19 discount from face value); Personal Fin. Co. v. Endicott, 238 S.W.2d 51
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even though it has been-involved in the transaction through all its phases."19 The
whole problem of credit sales as it relates to usury has been very ably discussed
in a recent comment in this Law Review. 120
Missouri courts indicate that they are bound by stare decisis and any change
must come from the legislature. 12 1 Courts of other states have not found them-
selves so bound by tradition and have held credit sale transactions to be loans
(made usurious by the inclusion of finance charges) running from the finance
company to the buyer for the purchase of the goods from the dealer.' 22
F. Pleading and Procedure
1. In General
As previously noted, usury may be used either as a basis upon which to
predicate an action, 123 or as a defense.12 4 As a general rule usury must be specially
(St. L. Ct. App. 1951) (sale of tractor chassis on "time," with credit price
increased by $544 over cash price-purchaser's purchase money note sold to
finance company for $544 less than face value).
119. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, supra note 103. The
finance company had furnished the auto dealer with mortgage and note forms,
and had furnished him with a schedule of "discounts" so that the dealer could
determine the amount to increase his credit price over that price at which he
could sell the purchaser's notes to the finance company.
120. Willard, Finance Charges or Time Price Differential in Installment Sales-
Usury?, 24 Mo. L. REv. 225 (1959).
121. Wyatt v. Commercial Credit Corp., supra note 115. See also Anderson,
Retail Installment Sales and Revolving Credit Acts: Missouri Constitution Article
III, Section 44, 25 Mo. L. REv. 239 (1960).
122. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 608, 249 S.W.2d
973, 977-978 (1952), wherein the court stated: ". . . finance companies have
seized upon the 'credit price rule' as a means of obtaining more than a 10%
return upon what is in form a sale, but is in substance, a loan. It is obvious that
if a prospective purchaser of a car, radio, refrigerator, etc., should borrow $1,000
directly from a finance company, then buy the article with the money and
execute a one year note to the finance company for $1,200, such transaction
would be usurious. But the finance companies are accomplishing the same result
by having dealers in cars, radios, refrigerators, etc., handle the sale in the first
instance, and under the guise of a credit price, add an excessive charge which
inures to the finance company, because the dealer is reasonably confident in
advance of the sale that he can transfer the papers to the finance company for
his own cash price. Thus the finance company is getting the benefit of the
increase. Nor is the increase purely for credit risk, because the car, radio, refrigera-
tor, etc., is usually insured against normal hazards.
"The result is that, by the simple expedient of providing forms, and a rating
book to the seller, and buying the conditional sales contract and note from
him, the finance companies are receiving a usurious rate of interest." Jackson v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76 (1954) (held transaction
was a loan from finance company to the purchaser of the automobile). Cf. Seebold
v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944).
123. Crow v. Stevenson, 274 S.W. 1102 (Spr. Ct. App. 1925) (suit to recover
usury).
124. Central Missouri Trust Co. v. Smith, 213 Mo. App. 106, 247 S.W. 241
(K.C. Ct. App. 1923) (suit on promissory note-accommodation maker defended
on ground that plaintiff became holder as a result of a usurious loan to payee).
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pleaded in order that it may be shown at trial,. 25 and while there are exceptions to
this rule,12 6 the preferred method would be specially to plead usury in all cases,
where it is to be shown at trial. To state a cause of action based upon usury there,
must be alleged the amount of the debt, the length of time the debt is to run, and:
the fact that the obligee has taken usurious interest on the debt. 27 The burden of
proof is upon the one who seeks to establish usury, 28 but such usury need only
be shown by a preponderance of evidence and need not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 20 Questions of fact in legal actions involving usury are left to
the determination of the jury,30 while the judge is the fact finder in actions in-
volving equitable remedies.' 3' The type of relief sought will determine whether
the action should be brought on the legal side or on the equity side of Missouri's.
court system. 3 2
2. Who May Plead
Missouri courts seem more liberal than the majority in their decisions as to
who may plead usury.133 Generally it may be said that the question of who may
125. Zancker v. Northern Ins. Co., 238 Mo. App. 110, 176 S.W.2d 523 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1943). (Insured sued insurance company on policy, which providect
that it was suspended if insured mortgaged certain property. The insured did
mortgage the property but contended that the mortgage was void because usury
was involved. The court held that the insured must specially plead usury in
order to show the mortgage void at trial.) Missouri Discount Corp. v. Mitchell,
216 Mo. App. 100, 261 S.W. 743 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
126. Milholen v. Meyer, 161 Mo. App. 491, 143 S.W. 540 (K.C. Ct. App.
1912) (not necessary to specially plead in order that mortgagor recover from
mortgagee damages for wrongful taking of chattel under mortgage void for usury);
Johnson v. Simmons, 61 Mo. App. 395 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895) (not necessary to,
specially plead in order that mortgagor replevy chattels from mortgagee who was
holding goods under a mortgage void for usury). In Zancker v. Northern Ins. Co.,
supra note 125, at 117, 176 S.W.2d at 527, the court stated: "In any action
between a mortgagor and mortgagee, or between parties standing in legal privity
with said parties, where the mortgage is the basis of the claim of either such
party, usury may be shown without a special plea to invalidate the mortgage.
Such rule is applied to particular classes of cases like possessory actions or actions
for damages for wrongful conversion by a mortgagee."
127. Twamley v. E. B. Jones Used Car Arena, 241 S.W.2d 799 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1951). Plaintiff alleged that he was obligated to pay $1336.80 on a $900
debt. The court dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to include in the petition
the rate of interest charged and the length of time the loan was to run.
128. Bahl v. Miles, 222 Mo. App. 984, 6 S.W.2d 661 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928);
Tobin v. Neuman, 271 S.W. 842 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925).
129. Auto Money Corp. v. Clark, 236 Mo. App. 862, 153 S.W.2d 113 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1941); 55 AM. JUR. Usury § 164 (1946).
130. Crow v. Stevenson, supra note 123 (suit for recovery of usury paid).
131. Arbuthnot v. Brookfield Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 98 Mo. App. 382, 72 S.W.
132 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903) (bill in equity to cancel note and deed of trust).
132. If the action is simply for a return of usury paid, or replevin for goodsr
held under a void pledge, it would be brought on the legal side, while an action
for an accounting in equity would, of course, be brought on the equity side, as
in Bruegge v. State Bank, 74 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1934). Actions for the can-
cellation of instruments must be brought in equity. See Snyder v. Crutcher,
137 Mo. App. 121, 118 S.W. 489 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909), where is was determined
that cancellation could not be had in a Justice of the Peace Court which had
no equitable jurisdiction.
133. See 55 AM. JUR. Usury § 164 (1946).
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plead usury depends in great part upon the relief sought. The relief available will
be more fully discussed later. Suffice it to say at this point that a corporation
may neither bring an action nor make a defense on the ground that the loan in
question is usurious,134 nor is the plea of usury available to the usurer.185
G. Conflict of Laws Problem
Where there is a possibility of conflict between Missouri laws and the laws
of another state which allow a higher interest rate, Missouri courts generally apply
the rule that, in the absence of any subterfuge to evade the stricter Missouri laws,
the intention of the parties governs as to which laws should apply,s6 and parol
evidence is admissible to show such intention.2a7 In the absence of evidence of the
intention, the laws of the place of performance of the loan contract prevail18 s Per-
formance is said to be the repayment of the loan.139 But Missouri's avowed public
policy against usurious contracts is not so strong that Missouri courts will refuse
to enforce a contract which would be unenforceable under Missouri law because
of usury if such contract is legal under the laws of the other state.140 Therefore,
the above rules are sometimes disregarded or modified in order to prevent a loan
from being usurious. In Davis v. Tany,1 41 there was no stipulation as to the in-
tention of the parties and the loan was to be repaid in Missouri. The court indi-
cated that since the interest was usurious under Missouri law, it would be pre-
sumed the parties intended the governing law to be that of the state of execution
of the contract, in which the interest rate charged was legal.242 In Hansen v.
Duval,143 the plaintiff in purchasing property assumed his predecessor-in-title's
notes, but later gave defendant-holder his own notes. The court disregarded the
facts that the later notes were both executed and payable in Missouri and that
both plaintiff and defendant were residents of Missouri, and based its decision
on the fact that since plaintiff's predecessor's notes were payable in Kansas
plaintiff's notes assumed the same governing law-that of Kansas.
134. § 408.060, RSMo 1959.
135. Missouri Real Estate Syndicate v. Sims, 179 Mo. 679, 78 S.W. 1006
(1904). (The court held that the lender could not defend in a breach of contract
action on the grounds that the contract was void because he himself had charged
usury.)
136. Davis v. Tandy, 107 Mo. App. 437, 81 S.W. 457 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904).
137. Hansen v. Duvall, 333 Mo. 59, 62 S.W.2d 732 (1933).
138. Central Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 85 Mo. App. 383 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900).
But the court indicated that if performance is placed in a state which has no
connection with the contract merely as a device to evade Missouri's usury laws,
such a device would fail. But see Cowgill v. Jones, 99 Mo. App. 390, 73 S.W.
995 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903), which indicated that the law of the place of execution
would govern.
139. Central Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, supra note 138.
140. Davis v. Tandy, supra note 136.
141. Id.
142. But see J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Tomlin, supra note 116, which
indicates a statement of place of performance is evidence that the parties intended
the law of that place to govern.
143. Supra note 137.
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III. RELIEF UNDER MISSOURI's GENERAL USURY STATUTES
A. Specific Application of Section 408.050
1. Introduction
Section 408.050, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1959), provides:
No person shall directly or indirectly take, for the use or loan of money
or other commodity, above the rates of interest specified in sections
408.020 to 408.040, for the forbearance or use of one hundred dollars, or
the value thereof, for one year, and so after those rates for a greater or
less sum, or for a longer or shorter time, or according to those rates or
proportions, for the loan of any money or other commodity. Any person
who shall violate the foregoing prohibition of this section shall be subject
to be sued, for any and all sums paid in excess of the principal and
legal rate of interest of any loan, by the borrower, or in case of the
borrower's death, by the administrator or executor of his estate, and shall
be adjudged to pay the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee to be determined by the court.
This is Missouri's basic prohibition against the taking of usury and was first en-
acted in its present form in 1905.1-4 Prior to 1905 usury was prohibited145 but any
usury recovered from the lender went to the county for the benefit of the schools.148
The 1905 amendment for the first time allowed the borrower to recover the usuri-
ous interest. 4
7
Although section 408.050 provides that no person shall "take" interest in ex-
cess of the specified rates, this is merely the prohibitory provision. The word
"take" is defined in the same manner as "paid" in the recovery provision and has
a limiting effect upon the recovery.148 Recovery is allowed under the second
sentence of the section, which expressly subjects the taker of the "sums paid"
in excess of principal and legal rate of interest to suit brought by the borrower
or other designated persons. Notice that the "sums" referred to by the provision
are not limited solely to those expressly designated as excess interest but could
be the previously discussed "lender's discount, .... bonuses" or other devices by
144. Mo. Laws 1905, at 172-173, amending § 3708, RSMo 1899.
145. See Peters Shoe Co. v. Arnold, 82 Mo. App. 1 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899).
146. See Ransom v. Hays, 39 Mo. 445 (1867).
147. See Flinn v. Mechanics' Bldg. Ass'n, 93 Mo. App. 444, 67 S.W. 729 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1902), indicating that there was no statute in force at that time which
allowed the borrower to recover usury paid.
148. Rukavina v. Accounts Supervision Corp., 241 Mo. App. 195, 237 S.W.2d
503 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951). For purposes of discussion cases decided under §
408.060 will also be included in this section because of the similarity of the re-
lief given to the borrower under § 408.060 to that provided for him under
§ 408.050. The basic difference in the two statutes is that under § 408.060 the
borrower is still indebted to the lender and is allowed to offset the usury he has
paid against the principal and legal interest which the lender may recover from
him, while under 408.050, the borrower is attempting to recover the usury he has
paid but the lender is allowed to retain the principal and legal interest.
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which unscrupulous lenders try to make a profit larger than that allowed by
law.149
2. When Is Usury "Paid" and Amount Recoverable Under Section 408.050
a. Generally
In determining when usury is "paid," the courts first determine which interest
rate is applicable to the loan in question-(six per cent if no rate is specified but
the parties do agree that interest is to be charged, or up to eight per cent com-
pounded annually if the parties so specify). The courts then ascertain whether or
not the lender has actually received from the borrower a sum in excess of princi-
pal plus the applicable interest rate. 50 If it is so found that an excess has been re-
ceived by the lender, the lender has been "paid" usury.L51
To compute the amount the borrower can recover in his action, the courts
look to the language of section 408.050, determine that the lender is entitled only
to principal and "legal" interest (six per cent simple interest), and allow the bor-
rower recovery of any sum in excess of this rate. 5 2 Recovery is determined by the
same method whether the usury is paid because of the inclusion of "bonuses" or
because of some other illegal device. 53
149. Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Glasner, 169 Mo. 38, 68 S.W. 917
(1902); Holmes v. Royal Loan Ass'n, 166 Mo. App. 719, 150 S.W. 1111 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1912).
150. Osborne v. Fridrich, 134 Mo. App. 449, 114 S.W. 1045 (St. L. Ct. App.
1908).
151. Quinn v. Van Raalte, 276 Mo. 71, 205 S.W. 59 (1918). (Approximately
$20,000 usury had been paid.) Crow v. Stevenson, 274 S.W. 1102 (Spr. Ct. App.
1925). ($833.84 usury had been paid.)
152. Gehlert v. Smiley, 114 S.W.2d 1029, 1034 (Mo. 1937), where the court
stated that the statute gives the right "to recover anything paid in excess of the
actual debt with legal interest." Whitworth v. Davey, 185 S.W. 241, 245-246 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1916), wherein the court stated: "In enforcing (§ 408.050) the court
must first look to the contract between the parties and ascertain what was the
lawful amount that was due from the borrower to the lender, and after determin-
ing that, then determine whether the payments made exceeded that amount. If
it finds that there was an excessive payment, and that that excessive payment
exceeded the lawful contract rate as contracted, then follows the remedy that is
to be applied, which is, by the very terms of the statute, a recovery of all sums
paid over and above the principal lent, plus legal interest, or 6 per cent. per
annum simple interest." See also Snyder v. Crutcher, 137 Mo. App. 121, 118 S.W.
489 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909), where the trial court allowed the borrower to recover
$43.36, but the appellate court reversed because the plaintiff had been allowed
equitable relief in a Justice of the Peace Court and because of errors in the
referee's allowances. But see Crutcher v. Sims, 184 Mo. App. 488, 170 S.W. 430
(Spr. Ct. App. 1914), where the borrower was allowed recovery of the amount
paid in excess of eight per cent. If any of the debt is still owing to the lender, the
borrower may, under 408.060, offset against that sum any amounts he has paid in
excess of principal and the six per cent "legal" rate. Seaver v. Ray, 137 Mo. App.
78, 119 S.W. 527 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909); Arbuthnot v. Brookfield Loan & Bldg.
Ass'n, 98 Mo. App. 382, 72 S.W. 132 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903). Butt see Little v.
Hooker Steam Pump Co., 122 Mo. App. 620, 100 S.W. 561 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907),
where the borrower was only allowed to offset the amount in excess of eight per
cent, but the borrower had only asked for relief to that extent.
153. Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Glasner, supra note 149, at 47, 68
S.W. at 919, wherein the court stated: "It will be thus observed that under the
law, all payments, whether made in the shape of interest, or commissions or
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,b. Recovery of Illegally Compounded Interest
Prior to 1919, recovery of usury paid out under illegal compounding provi-
sions was computed and allowed in the same manner as in other usurious con-
tracts. 1" This is best exemplified in the Springfield Court of Appeals' decision of
the case of Whitwort. v. Davey.25  There the loan drew interest at eight per cent
and the loan contract had provisions for the compounding of interest not only an-
nually but also semi-annually in violation of statute. However, the facts indicated
that the borrower had repaid no more than the principal amount plus eight per
cent interest compounded annually. The court reiterated the former holdings of
the appellate courts of Missouri that the illegal compounding provision did not
make the contract usurious per se, but that the provision was void. The court then
logically found that since the interest compounding provision was void, the lender
was not entitled to receive interest compounded annually since that would be in
effect making a new contract for the parties, but was entitled to only eight per
cent simple interest. But because the lender had received more than eight per cent
simple interest he had been "paid" usury and the borrower was entitled to re-
cover the sum paid in excess of principal and six .per cent "legal" interest. At the re-
quest of the concurring judges the case was certified to the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri. In 1919 in its decision of the Wkitwortk case,' 6 the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri agreed that the compounding provision was void, but the court felt no com-
punction in making a new contract for the parties. The court held that the lender
was entitled to eight per cent interest compounded annually, and there was no
usury in the contract because the lender had not yet received more than principal
plus eight per cent interest compounded annually. The court reached this decision
in spite of the fact that interest may be compounded only if the parties expressly
so contract and the fact that it had just declared the compounding provision void.
The court gave two reasons why there could be no recovery in this case: (1) be-
cause there had been no payment in excess of principal plus eight per cent interest
compounded annually, and (2) because section 408.050 does not specifically refer
to the compounding section as it does to other interest regulating sections.
Apparently the lack of reference takes precedence over the words "directly or in-
directly take" in the prohibitory language of section 408.050. Query if the court
would have allowed recovery if more than principal and eight per cent interest
compounded annually had been paid to the lender. 57
brokerage or as principal, may be deducted from the sum actually loaned with
legal interest added, and if the sum so paid in any of the said shapes or forms, or
by whatever name it might be called, equals the loan and legal interest, the debt
is considered paid and discharged."
154. Kessler v. Kuhnle, 176 Mo. App. 397, 159 S.W. 768 (St. L. Ct. App.
1913).
15. Supra note 152.
156. 279 Mo. 672, 216 S.W. 736 (1919).
157. The court also stated that equity would follow the law, so it seems that
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c. Recovery in Installment Loans
The Supreme Court's decision in the Whitwortk case seemingly put to rest
the conflict between the appellate courts as to when a borrower may sue to re-
cover usury when the loan is being repaid in installments. The case of Lawler v.
Vette 58 had held that where the usurious loan was being repaid in installments
no usury was paid and no action would lie for its recovery until a sum in excess of
principal and lawful interest had been paid to the lender. In contrast, Long v.
Green County Abstract & Loan CoY1 9 had indicated that in a usurious installment
loan the borrower could either sue after each installment was paid to recover back
the sum paid in excess of the principal and legal interest of that particular install-
ment, or he could sue to recover the usury after the total principal and interest
were paid. Using the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Wkitwortk. case, later deci-
sions on installment loan transactions have held that the borrower cannot recover
any amount until a sum in excess of the total principal and lawful interest have
been paid to the lender. 6 ,
The Whitwortlk decision's adverse effect upon the already questionable relief
afforded to the borrower may be seen in the case of Rukavina v. Accounts Supervi-
sion Corp. 6" The Rukavina case involved an installment loan which was to be
repaid in twelve monthly installments. The loan itself drew interest at eight per
cent per annum and the loan contract not only contained illegal interest com-
pounding provisions but also required that the borrower pay other usurious
charges as well. The lender conceded that each monthly payment contained one-
twelfth of the total usurious interest provided for by the contract and that he
had received such interest in the two payments which the borrower had paid, but
he contended, and the court so found, that the borrower was not entitled to re-
cover usurious interest on the two payments which he had made. The court re-
fused to accept the argument that if the loan is to be repaid in installments any
excess paid on an installment beyond principal due and lawful interest constitutes
usury and hence should come within the meaning of "all sums paid in excess of
principal and legal rate of interest" of section 408.050.
Had the holding in the Long case been followed through the years, the
lenders of usurious loans might have been subjected to the possibility of suits each
time they received an installment, which might have proven to be a deterrent to
those lenders. However, the lenders might have avoided suits simply by tendering
the usury to the borrower after the latter threatened suit.162
d. Suggested Reform of Procedural Steps
At best, under Missouri law, the determination of when usury has been
"paid" and when the borrower may recover such usury is somewhat involved and
decidedly not in the borrower's best interest. Apparently because of the word
158. 166 Mo. App. 342, 149 S.W. 43 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
159. 252 Mo. 158, 158 S.W. 305 (1913).
160. Major v. Putney, 293 S.W. 81 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927).
161. 241 Mo. App. 195, 237 S.W.2d 503 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951).
162. See Van Doeren v. Pelt, 184 S.W.2d 744 (St. L. Ct. App. 1945), for the
application of § 408.060 to a usurious installment loan transaction.
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"take" which is contained in the prohibitory language of section 408.050, the loan
contract may be plainly usurious but the borrower must have repaid the principal
and the lawful rate applicable plus a usurious sum before he can recover any-
thing.10 3 Then, in his recovery, he is referred back to the six per cent "legal"
interest provision and may then recover all sums paid in excess of principal and
interest at that rate. This method seems to require unnecessary steps and limits
the effectiveness of section 408.050.
It is submitted that perhaps the following approach might be somewhat easier
to follow, or in any event, it would be more beneficial to the borrower. It should
be first determined that the word "take" does not have the same definition as
"paid" and does not have a limiting effect upon the recovery provisions. The whole
transaction should be thoroughly examined to determine whether or not it re-
quires the borrower to repay more than the principal sum loaned plus lawful
interest. If the transaction does require such an excess payment, then it should be
declared usurious whether or not the borrower has actually paid any excess. With-
out the limiting effect of "take," the borrower could then invoke the recovery
provision and sue to recover any sum in excess of principal and "legal" interest, and
if it is determined that he has actually paid such an excess, he would be allowed
recovery even though the excess would not have brought the total interest above
the maximum allowable. Actually the only effect this proposed approach would
have would be to let the borrower sue and recover a lesser sum at an earlier date
rather than force him to pay more of the usury and then at a later date sue to
recover the aforementioned lesser sum plus that paid in the interim. By using this
approach, the courts would simply be punishing the perpetrator of an illegal con-
tract before he realizes the benefits from it.104
e. Cost Allowances Under Section 408.050
Section 408.050 expressly provides that the lender who is subject to be sued
for the usury he has received is also liable for the costs of the suit including an
attorney's fee.'0 5 The amount the borrower will be allowed under the costs provi-
sion is largely within the discretion of the trial court, though it may be deter-
mined either by the trial judge 6" or by the jury.167 As stated in Crutchler v.
8iins: 3.68
163. See Birkhead, Illegal Lending in Missouri, 16 Mo. L. REv. 251 (1951).
164. This is the procedure used in the application of § 408.060. See Foskin v.
Laessig, 32 S.W.2d 768 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930).
165. § 408.060 also provides that all costs of the action are taxed against the
usurious lender. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Zook, 133 Mo. App. 603, 113 S.W.
678 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
166. Crutcher v. Sims, supra note 152. (The borrower recovered $9.75 as
usury and $25 attorney's fees.)
167. Quinn v. Van Raalte, supra note 151, where the usurious sum was approxi-
mately $20,000 but recovery was had for $21,000, so approximately $1,000 was
allowed for costs. Crow v. Stevenson, 274 S.W. 1102 (Spr. Ct. App. 1925), where
approximately $830 usury and approximately $350 attorney's fees were recovered
by the borrower.
168. Suprz note 152, at 491, 170 S.W. at 431.
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That evidence as to what is a reasonable attorney's fee in a particular
case is merely advisory to either judge or jury cannot be questioned ....
There is no doubt in our minds that a judge who is expert on the value
of legal services can, from his own knowledge of a case tried before
him, fix the amount of a fee to be allowed to an attorney in the case
without any advisory testimony as to their value.
Thus it seems that while a certain amount could be prayed for and evidence would
be admissible to support the prayer, this would not be binding upon the court.
The allowances go to the party and not the attorney,16 9 but an inclusion in the
petition of a prayer for a certain sum for these allowances will not be added to
the amount of usury prayed for in order to make up the jurisdictional amount
required for a trial in certain courts when the amount of usury itself is insuffi-
cient for the court's jurisdiction.170
Although a statute expressly allowing a party to recover costs and attorney's
fees is unusual, its actual worth is questionable. Seldom will the amount allowed
be sufficient to offset the actual costs of the suit.171 Furthermore, if the borrower
is still indebted to the lender the court may set off the borrower's allowances
against his debt to the lender.172 Another factor which detracts from the value of
this provision is that unless the borrower is successful in his suit, he will not be
entitled to the allowances..73 Thus even though the loan contract is plainly usuri-
ous, if the borrower is premature in bringing his suit for recovery he must stand
his own costs.1 74
3. Pleading and Practice
Section 408.050 expressly allows the borrower, his administrator or executor
to recover usury, and the courts have extended this right to others. A person who
is an accommodation indorser or surety of notes and is obliged to pay them may
169. Bruegge v. State Bank, 74 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1934) (allowed $1,000 as
attorney's fee).
170. Wade v. Markham, 106 S.W.2d 939 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937), where plaintiff
sued for recovery of $20.80 as usury plus $150 attorney's fee. Suit was in the cir-
cuit court. The court dismissed the action because the required $50 jurisdictional
amount was not present. The court stated that the attorney's fees are costs to
be determined by the court and are not sufficient to give jurisdiction.
171. See Birkhead, supra note 163, at 261, discussing a case where the attorneys
for the borrower went to the Missouri Supreme Court twice and spent over 500
hours on the case. A total of $120 was recovered.
172. Bruegge v. State Bank, supra note 169, where the court offset the $1000
attorney's fees allowance against the $21,000 which the borrower still owed to the
lender.
173. Rukavina v. Accounts Supervision Corp., supra note 161.
174. "One cannot bring another into court and tax him with cost in defend-
ing against a nonexistent right . . . ." Lawler v. Vette, 166 Mo. App. 342, 352,
149 S.W. 43, 46 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912). But see Bruegge v. State Bank, supra
note 169, where the borrower brought an action in equity to determine how much
was owed to the lender. The court determined that $21,000 was still owed, but
allowed the borrower $1,000 attorney's fees.
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bring suity 5 as may the borrower's trustee in bankruptcy.1 76 A borrower's heirs at
law may also sue.177
Section 408.050 may be used as a basis for bringing suit,178 or it may be
used as a counterclaim when the borrower is being sued. 79
As to whom the borrower may sue, it is said in Snyder v. C-rutcherT80 that
a person who loans the money, who receives the interest paid, and who owns the
notes given for the loan, is the only necessary or proper party in an action at law
to recover usurious interest, and a third person to whom the notes were made
payable is not a proper or necessary party. Although recovery might be had
against a holder who took the usurious notes with full knowledge of the usury and
to whom the usury has been paid, if the notes are sold to a holder in due course
who takes without any indication of the taint, the borrower may not recover any
usury he has paid to such holder.""'
4. Effectiveness of Section 408.050
It is submitted that section 408.050 neither affords much relief to the bor-
rower nor penalizes the lender to any degree. Seldom will the amount that the
borrower recovers reimburse him for the time and money spent in court proceed-
ings; nor will it be of sufficient amount to induce him to assume the risk of the
court's finding against him on the issue of usury.
B. Specific Application of Section 408.070
1. Introduction
Section 408.070, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1959), provides that:
In actions for the enforcement of liens upon personal property pledged
or mortgaged to secure indebtedness, or to maintain or secure possession
of property so pledged or mortgaged, or in any other case where the
validity of such a lien is drawn in question, proof upon the trial that the
party holding or claiming to hold such lien has received or exacted
usurious interest for such indebtedness shall render any mortgage or
pledge of personal property, or any lien whatsoever thereon given to secure
indebtedness, invalid and illegal.
This section was first enacted in 1891,182 and apparently is Missouri's first provi-
sion for cancellation of liens because of the involvement of usury. 83
175. Osborne v. Fridrich, 134 Mo. App. 449 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908).
176. Securities Inv. Co. v. Rottweiler, 7 S.W.2d 484 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928).
See also McDonnell v. DeSota Say. & Bldg. Ass'n, 175 Mo. 250, 75 S.W. 438
(1903).
177. Id. It would seem that § 408.060 would be available to any person who
was being sued on the debt. See note 4 of the annotations of § 408.060, Mo. ANN.
STAT. (1952).
178. Crow v. Stevenson, supra note 167.
179. Crutcher v. Sims, supra note 152.
180. 137 Mo. App. 121, 118 S.W. 489 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
181. Hamilton v. Fowler, 99 Fed. 18 (6th Cir. 1899) (applying Missouri law).
182. Mo. Laws 1891, at 171, § 2.
183. See Ransom v. Hays, 39 Mo. 445 (1867).
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a. "Received or Exacted"
Usury, as used in the application of this statute, could arise from any of the
usurious devices or transactions previously discussed. Section 408.070 expressly
states that it is to be applicable if the party holding the lien has "received or
exacted" usurious interest. "Received" is given the same meaning as "take" and
"paid" as used in section 408.050.84 However, "exacted" is given a much broader
meaning, and it is from the inclusion of this word that section 408.070 gets most
of its effect. Unlike "take" or "paid" in section 408.050, there is no need for actual
payment of an amount in excess of principal and lawful interest to bring the
transaction withirn the meaning of "exacted" in section 408.070.185 In fact there is
no need for a repayment of any amount. So long as the obligor has agreed to pay
usury and the obligee has demanded a pledge to secure it this is "exacting" usury
within the meaning of section 408.070.86 As stated in Drennon v. Dalincourt,1st
"where the mortgagee or pledgee exacts usury, or receives it without exacting it,
on his debt he loses his lien"'
b. Illegal Compounding Provision Not "Exacting"
As previously stated, because the prohibitory language of the usury statutes
does not specifically refer to the compounding section, a loan contract which
calls for illegal compounding of interest is not, without more, usurious. Nor does
this illegal provision bring the contract within the meaning of "exacted '"88 As
stated in Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Glasner,18 9 "it was never con-
strued that this section (prohibiting compounding more often than once per
year) had any effect upon ... the mortgage, lien or pledge given to secure the
loan." Under the Supreme Court's holding in the Whitworth case, section 408.070
would apply to such a contract only if the lender had actually received more
than the principal plus eight per cent interest compounded annually.
3. Section 408.070 Applied
a. Liens, Pledges, or Mortgages of Personal Property
Section 408.070 expressly provides that if the lender has exacted or received
usurious interest upon an indebtedness, then any lien, pledge, or mortgage of
personal property given as security for such indebtedness shall be invalid and
illegal. Because of its remedial nature, the courts declare that this statute shall
be liberally construed.'10 This liberality may be best seen by the fact that,
184. Johnson v. Vette, 77 Mo. App. 563 (St. L. Ct. App. 1898).
185. Missouri Discount Corp. v. Mitchell, 216 Mo App. 100, 261 S.W. 743
(K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
186. Johnson v. Vette, supra note 184.
187. 56 Mo. App. 128, 133 (K.C. Ct. App. 1893).
188. Kessler v. Kuhnle, 176 Mo. App. 397, 159 S.W. 768 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913)
(eight per cent interest compounded twice per year).
189. 169 Mo. 38, 46, 68 S.W. 917, 919 (1902).
190. Central Missouri Trust Co. v. Smith, 213 Mo. App. 106, 247 S.W. 241
(K.C. Ct. App. 1923).
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although relief under section 408.070 may be sought in equity, there is no requisite
that the one seeking relief must do equity (tender the amount legally due the
lender) before he may have the mortgage, pledge, or lien of personal property
declared invalid.01 Instead, the pledge, lien or mortgage of the personal property
may be cancelled and the property returned to the pledgor upon the showing
that the lender has received or exacted usury1 92 no matter how much of the
debt may still be owing.193 This attitude of the courts was well stated in Lyons
v. Smith:10 '
There is no equity for plaintiff to do as a condition precedent to relief.
Defendant, of his own volition, corrupted his security. His mortgage
is and was void ab initio, and he cannot, as he seeks to do, predicate
rights upon a lien that never existed.
Notice that in the above quotation the court declared the mortgage was void
ab initio. This is the usual declaration when such a pledge, lien or mortgage is
declared invalid, and such a holding may be of real value when the pledgee or
mortgagee has disposed of the pledged or mortgaged property before suit is
brought. Thus the pledgee or mortgagee would be liable for conversion of the
property even though the disposal might have been otherwise legal.195 This ab
initio effect is explained in Voorkis v. Staed'96 in the following manner:
The ground of the power of the court under this act to declare a lien
of the instrument or pledge invalid and illegal is the fact that usurious
interest was received or exacted. The judgment of the court in so de-
claring can not be rendered until after proof upon a trial of the antecedent
reception of usury, but the effect of the judgment is coextensive with
its cause; hence is retrospective and renders the mortgage or pledge
invalid and illegal from the date when the usurious interest was received
or exacted, and not merely from the date of the trial and the adduction
of evidence ascertaining the prior fact of usury.
Since the lien or pledge is void ab initio, a foreclosure of the pledged property
with sale to the pledgee is of no consequence and gives the pledgee no better
title than he had before.197 However, this ab initio effect cannot be used to
191. Compare note 220 infra and accompanying text.
192. Winfrey v. Strother, 145 Mo. App. 115, 128 S.W. 849 (K.C. Ct. App.
1910).
193. Smith v. Becker, 192 Mo. App. 597, 184 S.W. 943 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
194. 111 Mo. App. 272, 277, 86 S.W. 918, 919 (K.C. Ct. App. 1905).
195. Hilgert v. Levin, 72 Mo. App. 48 (K.C. Ct. App. 1897). Lender was a
pawnbroker who took the borrower's diamond shirt stud as security for a usurious
loan. Lender sold it when it was not redeemed within the 60 day statutory period.
The court held that he had converted it because his possession based on a usurious
loan was wrongful in the first instance.
196. 63 Mo. App. 370, 374 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
197. Central Missouri Trust Co. v. Smith, supra note 190. The pledgor had
pledged promissory notes of which he was the named payee as security for a
usurious loan from pledgee.
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destroy the rights of a bona fide purchaser of the mortgage or the goods,"", but
the transactions are examined carefully to determine whether the purchaser is
really bona fide or whether he had knowledge of the taint of usury.21 9
Another area of liberal construction in the application of section 408.070 is
that of classifying what is "personal property" within the meaning of the statute.
The courts include not only tangible personal property, such as furniture2 0 and
automobiles, 2 0' but also intangibles such as wage assignments,20 2 corporate shares203
and promissory notes204 as well. These pledged promissory notes may be those
of which the pledgor was payee or a holder,20 5 or they may be notes of which
the pledgor was maker.20 6 In any case the pledgee or mortgagee may not retain
possession of the goods after the pledge or mortgage has been declared invalid.
Retention of possession by the pledgee after demand for their return by the
pledgor is a conversion of the pledged goods.207
The courts further declare that if there is a doubt whether the transaction is
a pledge or a conditional sale of the goods, the presumption will be that of a
pledge. 208
In a given case where the pledgor or mortgagor has actually paid usury he
may use section 408.070 in conjunction with section 408.050 and not only have
the pledged or mortgaged goods returned to him but may also recover the usury
and costs under section 408.050.209 However, if section 408.070 is used separately
there can be no recovery of usury actually paid.210 Furthermore, if section
408.070 is used singly or in conjunction with section 408.050 but recovery is not
allowed under section 408.050, there can be no recovery of costs.211 The courts
refuse to construe sections 408.050 and 408.070 together to this degree even
198. Smith v. Mohr, 64 Mo. App. 39 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895), but the court
found that the plaintiff, who was attempting to foreclose the mortgage on house-
"hold goods, was not a bona fide purchaser but had acquired the mortgage with
knowledge of its usurious taint.
199. Id.
200. Johnson v. Vette, supra note 184.
201. Leavel v. Johnston, 209 Mo. App. 197, 232 S.W. 1064 (K.C. Ct. App.
1921).
202. Henderson v. Tolman, 130 Mo. App. 498, 109 S.W. 76 (K.C. Ct. App.
1908) (assignment cancelled).
203. Smith v. Becker, supra note 193.
204. Securities Inv. Co. v. Rottweiler, 7 S.W.2d 484 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928).
205. Id.; Central Missouri Trust Co. v. Smith, supra note 190.
206. Winfrey v. Strother, suipra note 192.
207. Holmes v. Schmeltz, 161 Mo. App. 470, 143 S.W. 539 (K.C. Ct. App.
1912).
208. Smith v. Becker, supra note 193. Defendant made the somewhat ridiculous
contention that plaintiff's predecessor in title had sold (with an option to repur-
chase) to him $20,000 worth of corporate stock for $100.
209. Rukavina v. Accounts Supervision Corp., 241 Mo. App. 195, 237 S.W.2d
503 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951) (mortgage was cancelled but no recovery under
§ 408.050 because usury had not yet been paid).
210. Flinn v. Mechanics' Bldg. Ass'n, 93 Mo. App. 444, 67 S.W. 729 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1902).
211. Rukavina v. Accounts Supervision Corp., supra note 209.
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though both sections are in the same chapter and both are aimed toward the
same general end.212
If the pledgor or mortgagor has not paid all that is legally due the pledgee
or mortgagee, cancellation of the pledge or mortgage under section 408.070
does not affect the validity of the principal note or debt.213 The borrower still
owes the principal plus legal interest even though his security has been returned
to him.214 And the debt is still valid even though the lender may have charged
so much interest that he will be subject to criminal prosecution.2' 5 Further, even
though the pledge or mortgage is void, the property can still be reached on
ordinary process in satisfaction of the debt.
b. Usurious Transactions Involving Real Property
Section 408.070 expressly applies only to liens, pledges or mortgages of per-
sonal property and the courts refuse to apply it to transactions in which real
property security is involved. 2' 6 However, section 408.070, applied in conjunction
with sections 408.050 and 408.060, does have some effect upon a usurious transac-
tion involving real property. These sections will cancel that part of the contract
calling for the illegal interest.217 Moreover, the borrower may have a deed of
trust or mortgage of real property cancelled2ls or a foreclosure sale by the lender
enjoined 219 if the security transaction was tainted with usury. However, these
latter two remedies will be available only if the mortgagor shows a willingness
to do "equity." This "equity" is generally construed to be either an unconditional
tender to the mortgagee of the amount legally due him or a payment into court
for his benefit.2 20 In some cases an allegation in the petition that the plaintiff
is willing to pay the lender whatever the court finds to be due him will suffice.221
The amount that must be tendered or paid is usually held to be the amount of
the principal due and legal interest plus any foreclosure expenses that the
mortgagee may have incurred.222
4. Purging the Contract of Usury
The fact that the lender has once "exacted" usury from the borrower will
not prevent the parties from removing the usury from the contract when they
212. See Birkhead, supra note 163.
213. Leavel v. Johnston, supra note 201.
214. Henderson v. Tolman, supra note 202.
215. Seaver v. Ray, 137 Mo. App. 78 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).
216. Cavally v. Crutcher, 9 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Spr. Ct. App. 1928), wherein
the court stated: "Usury in this state does not invalidate a real property mortgage
or deed of trust...
217. Gehlert v. Smiley, 114 S.W.2d 1029 (Mo. 1937).
218. Arbuthnot v. Brookfield Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 98 Mo. App. 382 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1903).
219. Hecker v. Putney, 196 S.W.2d 442 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946).
220. Id.; Long v. Greene County Abstract & Loan Co., 252 Mo. 158, 158
S.W. 305 (1913); Major v. Putney, 293 S.W. 81 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927).
221. Arbuthnot v. Brookfield Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, supra note 218.
222. Anderson v. Curls, 309 S.W.2d 692 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958); Long v. Greene
County Abstract & Loan Co., .rupra note 220. But see Ruppel v. Building Ass'n,
158 Mo. 613, 59 S.W. 1000 (1900), where the court held that there was no uncon-
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,discover that it is usurious, thus forestalling the application of section 408.070.
In Peters Shoe Co. v. Arnold,22 3 the court declared that:
While the taint of usury will follow an indebtedness through all its
renewals however remote yet the parties are not incapacitated from
legalizing the illegal contract by withdrawing from it the element which
made it unlawful.
Thus if the parties have withdrawn the usurious element, there is no "exacting"
under section 408.070 even though the loan at one time bore usurious interest.
However, the purging must be in good faith and must be consented to by both
parties.224 A mere tender back of the usurious amount after suit is filed will not
withdraw the usury from the contract.225 In Adams v. Moody,226 where the
usury was credited upon the principal debt after the borrower had protested, the
court held:
The fact that when plaintiff ascertained there were objections raised
to his exacting usury and receiving same he afterwards credited the
money he so received as payments can not avail him as the statute pro-
hibits not only the receiving but also the exacting of usurious interest.
After he had either exacted or received usury in the note the provisions
of the statute in question then and there characterized the nature of
the transaction, and his subsequent action of giving credit on the note
for the moneys already exacted and received did not have the effect of
relieving him of the penalties of the law.
A loan transaction which is outwardly usurious may also be purged of such
usury if, at the trial, the lender can show that the amount which makes the
contract usurious was inadvertently included as a result of a mistake made by
either the lender or a third party.2 2r
5. Pleading and Practice
Section 408.070 contains no mention of who may enjoy its use, but it may
be said as a general rule that anyone who has an interest in the property might
have a lien, pledge or mortgage of the property declared invalid. More specifi-
cally, the courts have held that section 408.070 would be available to the bor-
rower, his administrator or executor, 228 the borrower's heirs at Iaw,229 his trustee
in bankruptcy,23 0 a subsequent mortgagee where the prior mortgage was tainted
223. 82 Mo. App. 1, 6 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899).
224. Sheridan v. Post, 140 Mo. App. 96, 119 S.W. 500 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
225. Id.
226. 91 Mo. App. 41, 48 (K.C. Ct. App. 1901).
227. Missouri Discount Corp. v. Mitchell, 216 Mo. App. 100, 261 S.W. 743
(K.C. Ct. App. 1924). The usurious charges were finance charges which the mort-
gagor had paid to the wholesaler from whom he had purchased the automobiles,
but which had also been included in the mortgages to the finance company which
had financed the purchases from the wholesaler.
228. Securities Inv. Co. v. Rottweiler, supra note 204.
229. Id.
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by usury,231 an attaching creditor of the borrower'2u an assignee of the property
pledged for a usurious loan, 233 and a maker of notes where the holder has pledged
them to secure a usurious loan.234 Although there is authority to the contrary, 23 5
a subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged goods probably may also have the
prior usurious lien or mortgage declared invalid.236 As stated in Davis v. Tandy:23r
[A] grantee of the entire title to property encumbered by a lien securing
usury is in privity with the grantor and may enter the plea of usury
as effectually as the grantor himself could, for the grantor has transferred
to him that right.
A creditor of the borrower who has not connected himself with the borrower's
property may not have a pledge or mortgage declared invalid under section
408.070.238
Section 408.070 may be used as a basis for an action,219 or it may be used
as a defensive measure.240
6. Effectiveness of Section 408.070
Whether section 408.070 affords any real, lasting relief to the borrower is
highly questionable. Although the security for the loan may be cancelled, the
debt is still valid and under Missouri law the lender could again regain possession
of or a lien on the property through levy or attachment. Only if the borrower
231. Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Glasner, supra note 189.
232. Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503, 66 S.W. 260 (1901). (The borrower had previ-
ously pledged the attached property for a usurious loan.) Voorhis v. Staed, supra
note 196, where the borrower had previously mortgaged the attached property for
a usurious loan. American Rubber Co. v. Wilson, 55 Mo. App. 656 (K.C. Ct. App.
1894).
233. Personal Fin. Co. v. Endicott, 238 S.W.2d 51 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951);
Smith v. Becker, supra note 193.
234. Johnson v. Grayson, 230 Mo. 380, 130 S.W. 673 (1910). (The borrower
was an accommodation payee of the defendant's promissory note and had pledged
it to the plaintiff as security for a usurious loan. Plaintiff sued defendant on the
note. The court held that plaintiff's suit was also for the enforcement of a lien
which was void because he had become the holder of the note through a usurious
transaction.) Keim v. Vette, 167 Mo. 389, 67 S.W. 223 (1902). (The holder of
negotiable promissory notes had entrusted them for safekeeping to a bailee. The
bailee wrongfully pledged them to defendant as security for a usurious loan. The
true owner was allowed to replevy them. The court held that while the defendant
was a holder in due course in other respects his possession of the notes was wrong-
ful because of his exaction of usury.)
235. Straus v. Tribout, 342 Mo. 511, 116 S.W.2d 106 (1937). (The court's
main basis was that the purchaser had taken his deed expressly subject to the
usurious mortgage.)
236. Missouri Discount Corp. v. Mitchell, supra note 227; Leavel v. Johnston,
supra note 201.
237. 107 Mo. App. 437, 442, 81 S.W. 457, 458 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904).
238. Griebel v. Imboden, 158 Mo. 632, 59 S.W. 957 (1900).
239. Johnson v. Simmons, 61 Mo. App. 395 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895) (suit to
replevy goods held by mortgagee under usurious mortgage).
240. Davis v. Tandy, supra note 237. (Action by mortgagee under a usurious
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was insolvent would the lender be penalized. Further, because of the lengths
to which the lenders go to prevent the borrower from realizing any relief and
because there is no recovery of costs under section 408.070, the expenses of
bringing or defending the suit will often prohibit the use of this section. Moreover,
if the borrower does pursue his remedy he may find when he next applies for a
loan that the lenders in his area will make no more loans to him.
IV. CONCLUSION
Missouri courts profess to have a deep and abiding animosity towards
usurious lenders24l and they do, at times, carry this animosity into effect with
results beneficial to the borrower. However, the courts are, on the whole, too
prone to treat usury as an economic factfinding rather than a moral problem.
Although the laws themselves are inadequate, the courts compound the injury
by refusing to extend their coverage as much as might be done even under the
restrictive language of the statutes.
The laws themselves are woefully inadequate not only to prevent usury, but
also to give the borrower adequate relief when such usury is brought into the
open. Missouri's general usury laws do not really penalize the lender nor greatly
benefit the borrower. At most the lender may lose his lien or pledge or be
forced to relinquish the usury and costs, or both. But, in any case he may
retain or recover the principal debt plus legal interest.
It is recommended that the legislature put more teeth into Missouri's general
usury laws by providing that the usurious lender forfeit part of the principal
as well as the usury. Further, the scope of the laws should be extended to include
transactions in which real property is taken as security for usurious loans, loan
contracts calling for purchases of great quantities of insurance, contracts which
contain illegal interest compounding provisions, and various other devices presently
used to skirt the usury laws. Credit sales should also either be brought under
the ban on usury or other legislation should be enacted to prevent excessive time
price differentials.
If usury is such a violation of public policy as it is said to be, then both
courts and legislature should be less reluctant to act in favor of the borrower
who in many cases is ill equipped to fend for himself.
GILBERT D. STEPHENSON
241. "No imaginable act or contrivance to cover up and conceal the usury
will avail the parties. They will not be permitted successfully to evade the provi-
:sions of the statute by any conceivable scheme or expedient." Webster v. Sterling
Fin. Co., 355 Mo. 193, 203, 195 S.W.2d 509, 514 (1946).
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